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NRO review completed

OVERFLIGHT RECONNAISSANCE OF CHINA AND SOUTHEAST ASIA

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TASK III BLACK SHIELD TAB III

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c. Will the Chinese public distinguish between an OXCART boom and a CHICOM supersonic aircraft? Page 5 25X1D

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g. Targeting requirements in Southeast Asia, China, North Korea and the Far East portion of the USSR. Page 9

h. Mission plans and profiles from Kadena. (Include latest range charts and several sample routes.) Page 10

TASK IV OXCART PROGRAM TAB IV

a. What is the status of the original OXCART concept? Page 1

b. What are the features in the OXCART which will permit it to carry out reconnaissance missions over the Soviet Union without being shot down? Are the same features been introduced into the SR-71? Page 2

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TASK V RECONNAISSANCE OF CHINA TAB V

a. Provide a summary of the record of the USIB over the past two years in terms of the effect of availability of reconnaissance capabilities on the Board's establishment of requirements. (What have been the actual photo requirements for the last two years? How have these been affected by availability of equipments?) Page 2

b. What is the actual record by period (i.e., monthly or semi-annually as most informative) of the total photographic reconnaissance of China? Point out deficiencies or excesses with an explanation of why. Identify instances where reconnaissance assets were not available in sufficiently timely fashion to meet an important intelligence requirement. Indicate why they would not be available. Page 5

c. In what regard can one say that the requirement for satellite reconnaissance of China has been on a part with USSR requirements and for how long in the past? Has there been any derogation of our ability to obtain coverage of China targets because the principal target has been the USSR? Page 7

d. What are the programmed capabilities for satellites aircraft, and drones through FY-67? Can these be accelerated? Is the present program adequate if the situation remains as is? How useful are these systems in a rapidly changing situation (i.e., quick response for tactical-like intelligence or for crisis management?) As an example, estimate the useable intelligence resulting from doubling the KH-4 rate and the effect on our intelligence appreciation of Communist China. Page 8

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